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The 1980s left a legacy of troubling economic, social, and other questions. Among them are trends in the division
of the nation’s product of consumer goods and services, the “economic pie.” The pie grew quite nicely in the
decade, but poverty nonetheless became more prevalent. This survey raises questions of equity, but does not attempt
judgcments.
Retirees have been consuming a growing portion of the pie-- their share, as we shall see, increased 43.1 percent from
1980 to 1990. They took so much that while the average working household’s piece of the pie rose 9.6 percent,
many suffered a decline in standard of living. Particularly affected  were households in the two lowest income
quintiles. The standard of living of some households was augmented when two spouses  went to work. Female labor
force participation rate, 51.5 percent in 1980, was 57.5 percent 10 years later.
This paper focuses on the distribution of the national consumer product. Increasing quantities of goods and services
appeared to be available to the nation’s consumers during the decade. How they were distributed is the concern
of this paper. How the growing consumption by rctirces affcctcd what was left for workers is the question. The
conclusion is that the increasing portion of the economic pie taken by retirees is tantamount to a sort of “tax” on
nonretirees that falls especially heavily on lower-income people. An important portion of retirees’ consumption was
health care. Since most of their health care was paid for by the federal and state governments, the tax on nonretirees
was not just a figure of speech but often an actual out-of-pocket cost.
What this paper does not focus on is the distribution of income and wealth. It accordingly is not concerned with
such calculations as the values of imputed interest income, fringe  benefits, and perquisites nor with bequests and
other transfers of assets. At one point I use income as a proxy for consumption in order to check on consumption
data in a way that I believe has some reasonable  validity.II. THE PUZZLING LOSS OF PURCHASING POWER IN THE 1980s
A worker’s real wage, of course, determines how much of the economic pie he or she is able to obtain. The
declining real wages of most working Americans, particularly those with lower and middle incomes, have been a
puzzle for analysts. A typical hourly-paid employee’s real wage, both before and after federal income and social
security taxes, declined from 1980 to 1990. However, mean real income of workers’ households increased 11
percent during this period largely because  of gains made by the top quintile and the increase in the proportion of two-
income families. The rise in female labor force participation during the decade was encouraged by the growing
inadequacy of the volume of goods and services that could be purchased with a single income.
Rising productivity should have been lifting the standard of living during the 1980s. The gain in manufacturing
productivity was especially gratifying and explains, in large degree, why consumer goods production (Federal Reserve
Board index) rose 25.8 percent from 1980 to 1990. Since output was depressed in 1980 by the recession, a fairer
comparison may be the production in 1978, a peak year, with that in 1990’ -- the gain was 21.4 percent.
Even the balance of trade deficit, a seriously burdensome drain of jobs and profits from the economy and a still
unresolved problem, brought a current benefit to consumers. During the 198Os, compared to previous decades,
Americans were the recipients of a substantial net inflow of goods from abroad. Data from the national income and
product accounts (NIPA) on merchandise exports and imports indicate that real net imports of consumer goods
increased somewhat more than 100 percent, about 110 percent, from 1980 to 1990. The volume of what the  NIPA
terms “consumer goods” rose 163 pcrccnt over the dccadc. Howcvcr, this category does not include foods,
automobiles, and petroleum, much of which is properly classified as consumer products, but how much is not clear.
Changes in the tax laws and their effect on the distribution of income have been closely studied by economists who
have widely concluded that these do not explain the shrinkage in the standards of living of wage eamers.2 The
decline in a typical wage earner’s after-tax income was smaller than the decrease in this person’s pre-tax income.
2While 1980s’ tax changes treated wealthy people generously, they benefited almost everyone.
The married person with three dependents who was paid for working 40 hours a week, 52 weeks a year and earned
the average wage of hourly-paid workers suffered a decline in after-federal-tax  income from 1980 to 1990. This
person, after withholding and social security taxes experienced a decline in annual after-federal-tax income from
$18,995 to $18,190 (1990 dollars), a 4.25 percent fall. The social security tax rates for everyone rose during the
decade, but this worker’s withholding tax rate declined. Overall, 12.85 percent of his income went to the Federal
government in 1990, down from 13.63 percent in 1980.
Studies of both the policies of the 1980s and the widening of the wage and salary gap between lower- and higher-
paid personnel do not yield a satisfactory explanation for the loss of real income of the majority of wage eamers.3
Two hypotheses could explain this phenomenon. (1) The data studied by economists might be so faulty that they
lead to false conclusions. (2) To a growing degree, goods and services were not available to their producers,  the
workers who created them, but were floating away into unnoticed hands -- there was a leak!
I am hardly a devout believer in the accuracy of economic and social statistics, and, as I shall explain, I have
problems with some of the data used in this study to locate the “leak.” But I do not find that the data are misleading
us. Indeed, their information is confirmed  by widcsprcad day-to-day experiences.  Young men and women for a
decade have been having difficulty in matching the standards of living of their parents. Not  infrequently households
with two working adults have been struggling to achieve as much purchasing power as a middle- or upper-middle
class father alone attained a generation earlier.
We turn to the possible “leak” of goods and services away from wage and salary earners. One facet of the persona1
income and consumption research has been neglected. Little attention has been given to the rapidly growing cohort
of retirees and their dependents. Relatively few people aged 65 and older are full-time workers and most of them
are not part of the labor force. Persons in the senior citizen cohort comprised 2.8 percent of the labor force in 1992
3and 16.5 percent of the population aged 16 and older.4 Still, both their numbers and their real incomes and
purchasing power have been rising during the past decade at rates considerably faster than those of the rest of the
adult population.
This paper concludes that the declining purchasing power of the wages and salaries of the lower-income half of the
population was, at least to a large degree, the result of the rising consumption of the retired cohort of the population.
These older folks were consuming a growing portion of the economic pie, seriously cutting into the share of the
working cohort. Although I have little doubt about the validity of this conclusion, my exploration of the issue is only
a beginning. Further studies will rcfinc the conclusions and deal with significant questions about the validity of at
least some of the data that arc available.
III. THE COST OF SUPPORTING RETIREEES
When I considered the “leak” that represented workers’ seeming loss of part of their production, I suspected the 65
and older segment of the population, who contributes proportionately little to the current economic pie. My surmise
was that the consumption of the older cohort left substantially less goods and services for many younger households
in 1990 than it did in 1980.
I have found that my suspicions were correct. Consumption by the 65 and older segment was indeed growing at the
expense of younger people. Between 1980 and 1990, the increasing share of  the economic pie consumed by the
older group was reflected in a significant deplction in the portion left for younger households. By 1990, this IO-year
gain of the older cohort amounted to a substantial cost to the average younger household -- at least $1,000 and
probably well over $1,500 a year.
I am designating the 65-year old and older households as “rctirces” and the 64-year old and younger ones as
“workers.” These categorizations are rough -- over 3.5 million people who have cclcbrated their sixty-fifth birthdays
4are working, and a great many retirees are on the other side of this age boundary. Actually, as I shall explain, I am
probably underestimating the population of the retirees considerably and therefore the size of the “leak.”
Once upon a time, when grandparents  were beyond the age when they could support themselves, they typically
moved into the home of one of their children. The persons who were wholly or partially supporting an aged parent
or both parents were well aware of the costs of supporting their elderly parents -- who nowadays, perhaps because
they effectively use their votes, are called “senior citizens.” Feeding, clothing, and sheltering aging parents put a
visible dent in their children’s household budgets. Paying their doctors’ and hospital bills often caused a family
budget crisis.
Our society has advanced in some respects. It has Social Security and widespread pension plans that enable older
people to live in separate dwellings, often in some inviting climate a long distance from their offspring -- perhaps
in Arizona or Florida. But the comfort of the 65-year olds and  older is still costly for working men and women.
Many contemporary households include lwo adults who work hard to maintain what they regard as an adequate or
satisfactory standard of living, who anxiously seek day care for their small children, and who spend little time
worrying about the economic well being of the grandparents. The latter now live, often quite well, in Sarasota or
Palm Desert. Their children have no notion that they are contributing to the payment of their parents’ food, clothing,
shelter, and amenities. Yet those who produce little or nothing and consume goods and services of substantial value
are consuming what active workers are producing -- leaving less for the workers. The financial flows that cause such
a phenomenon may or may not provide a moral basis for this distribution of consumption, but they do not alter the
fact.
Sometimes retired grandparents’ consumption is for their offspring. They may contribute to their grandchildren’s
educations and in other ways subsidize younger generations. Nonetheless, retirees are not producers and they
consume the product of workers even when members of workers’ households are the beneficiaries of their
5consumption. On the other hand, offspring, cspccially those who arc financially successful, may assume some of
the expenses of their cldcrly parents.
Many intergenerational transfers are not visible in the data that measure consumption. For example, grandparents
may provide childcare for working parents, run household errands for them, or tend their gardens. On the other
hand, adult offspring frequently care for ill or infirm parents. The exchanges of services between generations
complicate the question: Is the economic pie distributed equitably between retirees and workers? Providing health
care for the elderly would stem a prima facie ethical imperative unless doing so deprives young children of such
services. About two fifths of the consumption of the households headed by  people aged 65 and older is ostensibly
for health care.5
But “health care” is not clearly definable. Approximately  20 percent of the retirees’ aforementioned health
expenditures  is for nursing home cam. Many elderly are shcltercd and fed in such institutions. In fact, everyone
finds that food and shelter arc good for health but no one claims, for cxamplc, that a hamburger at McDonaIds or
an omelet at home is health cam. Working in a gymnasium under the supervision of a registered physical therapist
is health care. But the purchase of a treadmill for home exercise may bc rcgardcd by statistical authorities with a
bent toward ghoulishness as a rcercation and cntcrtainment  expenditure. Another question is: what portion of the
investments in such facilities as hospitals, nursing homes, and medical schools, and in research and development
should be considered the costs of people who may not live long enough to benefit from them?
The real cost of retirees to workers, which is reflected in declining standards of living of the workers during the
period studied, would have been less noticeable if the output of consumer goods and services had increased at a
faster pace. Greater productivity, higher employment or both reflected in higher output could have ameliorated this
situation. This paper concentrates on what occurred, not on what might have happened.IV. RAPID GROWTH OF RETIREE AGED POPULATION
According to the Bureau of the Census, the 1980s was a decade of rapid growth for retiree households, those with
“householders” (the Bureau of the Census term for the owner or renter of the dwelling or one of them if, say, a
husband and wife arc joint owners or lessees) aged 65 and older. Retiree households increased in number
considerably faster than the rest of the nation’s households, those 64-years old and younger. The older households
increased 21.4 percent from 1980 to 1990; the younger cohort 12.7 pcrccnl over the same period. These figures
closely parallel the increases in the populations 6%yc~ars  old and older and 18- to 64-years old, 21.5 percent and 11.7
percent, respectively  (Table A).
Table A
Retirement-Age Households Proliferating Rapidly (000s)
Social Security
Number of Households Population Population Number of Consumer Units worker
64 & under 65 & older 18 to 64 65 & older 64 & under 65 & older beneficiaries
1980 65,456 16,912 137,834 25,707 65,023 17,029 19,562
1990 73,785 20,527 154,006 31,224 76,889 20,079 24,838
% change
1980-1990 12.7 21.4 11.7 21.5 18.2 17.9 27.0
(Source: Bureau of the Census; Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration)
I have concentrated on households and what the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) calls “consumer units  (CUs),”
which are slightly different from households -- some households consist of more than one consumer unit.6 The
data on CUs provide an opportunity to observe the income and expenditures of the working and retired segments
of the population. Unlike households, the number of consumer units in the 65 and over- and 64 and under-age
categories increased at about the same pact from 1980 to 1990, 17.9 percent and 18.2 percent respectively (table A).
In view of the figures mentioned in the previous paragraph and the rise in the number of workers receiving Social
Security benefit payments, the accuracy of this aspect of the consumer unit data is suspect.An indication of the number of rctirccs is the number of former workers receiving old-age benefits under the Social
Security program. This population has been larger and growing faster than the number of households and consumer
units 65years old and older; it increased 27.0 percent from 1980 to 1990 (table A). A problem with the Social
Security roster for my purposes is that a household or a consumer unit may include more than one worker currently
receiving Social Security benefit payments.
An actual count of retirees would considerably exceed the number of Social Security beneficiaries. Many people
in these times of early retirement become retirees before they reach age 62, when they are eligible for Social Security
benefits. An insight into the number of early retirees is indicated by the drop in labor force participation between
the segments of the population aged 45 to 54 and 55 to 64. In 1992, about 81 percent of the former and 56 percent
of the latter were in the labor force. About one-fourth of the people who had been in the labor force when they were
45-54 years old apparently dropped out between the ages of 55 and 64. Based on this decline in labor force
participation, 5.3 million persons aged 55-64 were retirees -- consumers but not producers in the labor force?
Because of the absence of data on both the incomes and expenditures of Social Security beneficiaries, this appraisal
concentrates on households and consumer units. The figures derived from the use of these two categories, which
undcrcounts the actual population of rctirces, understates the cost to active workers of producing for retirees.
V. RETIREES’ PURCHASING POWER RISES ABOVE WORKERS IN THE DECADE
During the 1980s expenditures for goods and services consumed by the average consumer unit headed by a person
65-years  old or older, rose 21.9 percent from $18,751 to $22,859 -- in constant 1990 dollars -- an increase of $4,108.
Net Medicare benefit payments, payments less premiums, are added to the BLS data for this cohort’s expenditures.’
While the real expenditures of retirees grew 21.9 percent from 1980 to 1990, those of workers increased 7.1 percent,
$1,849 (table B).Table I3
Expenditures of Average Consumer Unit
Constant (1990) Dollars
64 & under 65 & older
1980 26,018 18,751
1990 27,867 22,859
% increase 1980 to 1990 7.1 21.9
(Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys.
Expenditures omit personal insurance and pension outlays. Expenditures
of 65 and over cohort include Medicare outlays.)
The gain for the rctirces reflected an increase in their consumption of the goods and services produced by the
workers. Conversely, workers wcrc losing a growing volume of the goods and services that they were producing -
- a leak of expanding volume. In 1980, 17.4 pcrccnt of the output of the average worker CU was consumed by
retiree CUs; in 1990, retirees wcrc taking 20.4 percent of the workers product (table C).’
Table C
Retirees’ Consumption of the Product of Worker CUs
Cost of Retirees to Workers (constant 1990 dollars)
total cost of percent of
expenditures 65 & older 64 & under’s
65 & older to average product for
$millions 64 & under 65 & older
1980 319,315 4,911 17.4
1990 458,989 5,969 20.4
percentage increase 1980 to 1990 43.7 21.5
percentage difference: 1990 less 1980 3.0
(Source: Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Sixty-five and older expenditures include Medicare, exclude payments for private pensions and insurance.)
The adverse effect on the real purchasing power of consumer units hcadcd by persons 64-years old and younger, the
9“working consumer units,” was the same as if government had taxed them an additional $836 or 3.0 percent of their
expenditures (Table C).
Problems with the costs and even the definition of health care thwarted the desirable refinement of the data.
Overcoming these difficulties would probably have slightly reduced the cost to workers of supporting retirees’
consumption. I am assuming that accounting for Medicaid would not significantly change the foregoing conclusions
because this federal program distributes funds to both worker and rctirce consumer units. Although the population
64 and younger is more than seven times as large as the number of persons 65 and older, the latter’s per capita
Medicaid benefits are nearly five times as large as the former’s.‘0 Employer-pai d health insurance policies cover
both workers and retirees and the distribution of the premiums bctwcen these two groups is obscure.
Whereas the missing health care data suggest that retirees share of total consumption was not quite as large as
indicated above, the saving statistics of consumer units hint otherwise. The latter data indicate savings that should
delight all those who have been shaking their heads in dismay over Americans’ lack of frugality. In 1980 CUs saved
5.8 percent of their after-tax income and by 1990 the saving rate had climbed to 10.9 percent. Meanwhile the
authoritative Bureau of Economic Analysis’ personal saving rate, an  item in the national income and product accounts
(NIPA) slumped from 7.9 percent to 4.3 percent (table D). (If saving is defined to include the net flow of funds into
the state and local government employee pension funds, the fall in NIPA personal saving over the decade was from
9.3 percent to 5.9 percent.)
Consumer units 65 and over saved -9.3 percent of their income, that is, they “dissavcd” in 1980. Ten years later
these older CUs’ saving rate was -0.7 percent (Table D). It fluctuated wildly during the decade, reaching a trough
of -15.6 percent in 1984 and then increasing until it reached its peak of 1.9 percent in 1989. (These percentages
were calculated without counting Medicare payments as either part of consumer units’ income or expenditure.)
10Table D
BLS Consumer Unit Saving Rates
1980 7.9 5.8 -9.3
1981 8.8 11.3 3.0
1982 8.6 15.6 8.8
1983 6.8 13.0 3.6
1984 8.0 9.9 -15.6
1985 6.4 6.2 -2.8
1986 6.0 6.5 -0.5
1987 4.3 10.6 -0.6
1988 4.4 9.6 1.4
1989 4.0 11.1 2.0
1990 4.3 10.9 -0.7
(Source: Column a, Bureau of Economic Analysis;













The accuracy of these saving rates is suspect. The staggering difference between the NIPA and the CU data on
saving trends and the rather erratic fluctuations in the latter raise questions about the expenditures of CUs. If the
NIPA data, which show an overall decline in saving during the 198Os, apply to the 65 and older cohort (and this
group too had a lower saving rate in 1990 than in 1980),  these retirees would have taken even more of the available
goods and services in 1990 than the above figures indicate.
The increase from 1980 to 1990 in the mean prc-tax income of 65 and older households was 94.7 percent and of
CUs, 96.0 percent. This close agreement at least superficially suggests that these data are accurate. A useful,
working hypothesis may therefore emphasize income as the determinant of changes in consumption and relegate
saving to an insignificant role. If saving were zero in 1980 and 1990 -- then income would be a perfect proxy for
expenditures.
11The Bureau of Census data show that the total income of the 65 and older households (net Medicare benefits added)
in 1990 dollars increased 54.2 percent, more than twice as fast as the total income of the rest of households, which
rose 25.1 percent (table E). Over the same 10 years the average income in 1990 dollars of retiree households rose
27.1 percent, while that of worker households increased 11 .O percent (table E). The zero saving hypothesis indicates
that the retiree cohort took 16.3 percent of the average worker household’s income in 1980, 20.0 pcrccnt in 1990.
The zero saving rate supposition thus leads to the conclusion that  the increase of retiree real income over the decade
would have had the same effect on the working households as a tax  increase of 3.7 percent on income. Based on
this analysis, the increasing income of the retirees cost the average active worker household $1,516 (1990 dollars)
more in purchasing power in 1990 than in 1980.
Table E
Retirees’ Income Versus Worker Household’s Real Income (1990 dollars)
total total cost of percent of
income income 65 & older 64 & under’s
64 & younger 65 & older to average income for
1990 $ millions 1990 $ millions 64 8 under 65 8 older
1980 2,416,048 392,641 5,999 16.3
1990 3,022,875 605,597 8,208 20.0
percentage increase 1980 to 1990 25.1 54.2 36.8
percentage difference: 1990 less 1980 3.7
mean income
mean income with Medicare
1990 $ 1990$




(Sources: Bureau of the Census, current population reports, series P-60: Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States;
Bureau of Labor Statistics, annual consumer expenditure surveys; Bureau of Economic Analysis.)
Of course, saving was not zero. Still the zero saving rate hypothesis gives a reasonable clue to the degree to which
the share of the economic pie going to retirees was eroding the workers’ portion. Until further research is able to
product better data, the 3.0 percent or 3.7 percent “tax” on the worker cohort stands as a fair explanation for the poor
growth in its standard of living during the past decade.
12VI. ETHICS AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL TUG-OF-WAR
Grandparents may be on their own and no longer occupying what used to be a child’s room upstairs. But they
continually have been absorbing a larger portion of the economic pie, leaving a relatively smaller share for the
segment of the population that is creating the pie. Rctirces paid Social Sccurily taxes, bought life insurance, and
received part of their income as workers in the form of employer contributions to their pension funds. Based on the
conventions of our society, they certainly have a right to the comfortable rctircmcnts that many of the elderly enjoy.
We conventionally tend to stress money even when a focus on physical output and consumption would clarify the
issue. People do tend to measure the value of their incomes and the amount of their consumption in terms of
specific goods and services when inflation rapidly devalues money. Then, because money is failing as a gage, we
complain about how few pounds of steak, pairs of shoes, yards of carpeting, and so forth we are able to buy. Let
us think for a moment about workers’ saving and retirees’ consumption, not in dollars, but in terms of goods and
services.
Take a person who goes to work at age 25, retires at 65, and dies at 75. During his forty years of work, his earnings
presumably measured his contribution to the production of goods and services, the goods and services he produced.
As a retiree, he consumes two-thirds of the goods and services that rcprcsentcd his average standard of living during
those working years. (In 1990, the average cxpcnditures of retiree CUs was 64 percent as high as those of worker
CUS.)
In terms of goods and services, he would have had to save one-sixth of his average income, maintaining a 16.7
percent saving rate, during 40 years of work to allow him two-thirds of his avcragc working years’ standard of living
in 10 years of retirement. Right now the NIPA saving rate is well under 5 percent of income. Looking at the issue
in this manner, retirees are unfairly consuming too large a share of the economic pie. However, with employer and
employee Social Security taxes, including Medicare, running at 12.4 percent of wages and salaries (a form of saving
13omitted from the NlPA figure), the avcragc worker may be justifying his future consumption as a retiree. Moreover,
we must weigh the wishes of the working cohort. Its members may bc glad to sacrifice a slowly increasing portion
of their standard of living in order to increase the comfort and especially to maintain the health of their parents.
The working population in the 1980s was not uniformly affected by the growing sham of the economic pie consumed
by retirees. Economists, sociologists, and others generally have recognized and have been pondering the implications
of the growing disparity in compensation between those whose occupations demand considerable skill, education,
or both and the rest of the active labor force. Further studies should determine whether or not the brunt of the
growing share of the economic pie of retirees is a significant cause of the decline in the standard of living of the
less skilled and less educated workers, the part of the population that clearly has had a declining standard of living.
Explorations into this area may find that a shift in the demand for labor toward lower-paid workers is partly
attributable to the growing population aged 65 and older. These pcoplc demand more personal services than the rest
of the population, services that in many instances can be  provided by persons with little skill or education. At the
same time, older people buy relatively fewer automobiles and, perhaps,  other products that require well-paid, skilled
personnel to manufacture.
Certainly suffering from a diminishing portion of economic pie arc adults under the age of 35, especially those below
25. The average real consumption expenditures of consumer units aged 24 and less declined 3.0 percent from 1980
to 1990. One might wonder whether grandparents are devouring their children. Those CUs from 25 to 34-years
old had a slight 1.1 percent increase in constant dollar consumption outlays. The rise in two-income households
made this gain possible.
VII. THE IMPERATIVE: VIGOROUS GROWTH OF ROBUST ENTERPRISES
Analysts have been pondering the prospect of a disproportionalely  large retime population and relatively few
14producers around the year 2025, when the wave of baby boomers reaching retirement  age is expected to crest. The
problem that economists have anticipated, and which was recognized in the 1986 legislation that increased Social
Security taxes, is, to a serious degree already here. It demands that the Findings of this preliminary study be pursued
and refined.
Enough is patently clear to warrant the adoption of policies that have been advocated for years but are never truly
on the political agenda. Retirement ages should bc raised. Moreover, retirees should be encouraged to engage in
public service activities. Many already arc volunteers in such federally sponsored programs as VISTA (Volunteers
in Service to America), Foster Grandparents, and Rclircd Senior Volunteers. Many more engage in hospital- or
church-related and other service activities. Retirees improve the standards of living of many workers and their
dependents by rcndcring services that national product and consumption data ignore.
Still the key issue in enlarging the economic pie for everyone is fundamental; it is unemployment. Excessive labor
supply has given employers the luxury of being needlessly choosy about whom they keep on their payrolls. They
can avoid the bother and expense of training less qualified personnel. And they push older people into early
retirement. The aforementioned decline in the labor force participation of persons 55- to 64-years old reflects the
opportunity to dispense with employees whose seniority and age may cncitle them  CO compensations and benefits
larger than those received by less experienced  people. Employers, moreover, arc likely lo prefer undertaking the
costs incurred when workers learn to use newly installed equipment and  CO exploit new techniques if the pupils are
young and will use the new skills longer than those approaching retirement. Youth is an attraction in this dynamic
era of computers and global business and finance.
In the early pstwar era, policies wcrc determined by the needs of youth, of the young veterans of World War II.
They needed education and jobs and most of them had opportunities for both. Policies emphasized robust economic
growth and thriving enterprise. Government contributed significantly to productivity by investing in both human
capital and public infrastructure. The G.I. Bill subsidized college and vocational educations. The interstate highway
15system contributed to industry’s efficiency. Low interest rates encouraged enterprise and enabled an unprecedented
proportion of young families to buy their own homes.
In contrast, today’s policies, both fiscal and monetary, are greatly intluenced by the interests of retirees in preserving
their incomes and wealth. The enemy of both fixed incomes and financial asset values is inflation. An enhancement
of the former is high interest rams.
However the United States and, indeed, other industrialized nations deal with problems arising from the real costs
to working people of supporting rctirecs, they should recognize that the problem is not something that will burst upon
us a quarter of the way into the next century -- it is here already. And they must remember that a nation’s future
depends on the vigorous growth of robust enterprises.
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